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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Plaintiff,
v.
VON LESTER TAYLOR,
Appellant/Defendant.
Case No. 910496
Priority No. 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(I) (Supp. 1994). This capital case may not
be poured over into the court of appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) (a) (Supp. 1994) .
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Emphasis added.
Amendment VIII of the United States Constitution provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Emphasis added.
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person or life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . .
Emphasis added.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1A. Whether Mr. Taylor' s plea should be set aside because
of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel?
Standard of review. Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims present a mixed question of fact and law. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). "Therefore, in a situation
where a trial court has previously heard a motion based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to
make an independent determination of a trial court' s
conclusions." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698). However, the factual
findings will "not be set aside on appeal unless clearly
erroneous." Id.
IB. Whether trial counsel' s philosophy about the role of
defense attorney' s conflicted with his duty to represent Mr.
Taylor and rendered Mr. Taylor' s plea involuntary and prejudiced
the outcome of this case?
Standard of review. The standard set forth in 1 above
applies.
1C. Whether trial counsel' s compensation was so inadequate
that it created a conflict of interest which deprived Mr. Taylor
of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at all
stages of the proceedings?
Standard of review. The standard set forth in 1 above
applies.
2. Whether the cumulative errors committed by trial
counsel during the sentencing phase rendered the death penalty
verdict arbitrary and capricious?
Standard of review. The standard set forth in 1 above
applies.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Taylor was charged by information on December 24, 1990
with the following nine counts:
(1) Criminal homicide. Murder in the First Degree (as to
Beth Potts), a capital offense [Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(b)
and/or (d)]:
(2) Criminal homicide, Murder in the First Degree (as to
Kay Tiede), a capital offense [Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(b)
and/or (d)];
(3) Attempted Criminal Homicide, a First Degree Felony
[Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (l)(b) and/or (d)];
(4) Aggravated Arson, a First Degree Felony [Utah Code Ann
§ 76-6-103];
(5) Aggravated Kidnapping (as to Tricia Tiede), a First
Degree Felony [Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302];
(6) Aggravated Kidnapping (as to Linae Tiede), a First
Degree Felony [Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302];
(7) Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony [Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302];
(8) Theft, a Second Degree Felony [Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404];
(9) Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a
Third Degree Felony [Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5]
On May 1, 1991, Mr. Taylor pled guilty to Count I, Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree (as to Beth Potts), a
capital offense, and Count II, Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
First Degree (as to Kay Tiede), a capital offense. Thereafter,
the trial court set a hearing date for the penalty phase, to be
heard before a jury.
The penalty phase began on May 15, 1991, and on May 22,
1991, the jury returned a verdict imposing a sentence of death on
Count I and a sentence of death on Count II.
On July 8, 1992, Mr. Taylor filed his opening appellate
brief. In response to that brief, the State filed Motion and
accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities seeking to
Strike Appellant' s Brief and to Disqualify Defense Counsel. On
September 23, 1993, this Court denied the State' s Motion to
Strike, but did grant its Motion to Disqualify Defense Counsel.
This Court stated that it appeared that defense counsel had
breached Rule 1.7(b) and Rule l,8(b) of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. As a result of this breach, this Court
disqualified Mr. Levine from any further participation in the
instant case.
During the plea process, the penalty phase hearing and
direct appeal to this Court, Mr. Taylor was represented by
defense counsel, Mr. Levine.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 22nd, 1990, Beth Potts, Kay Tiede and Rolf Tiede
were shot by intruders at the Tiede family cabin in Beaver
Springs, Utah. (R., Prelim. Hr' g, p. 8-9, 16, 27.) Beth Potts
and Kay Tiede died as a result of their injuries, Rolf Tiede
survived. Von Lester Taylor ("Mr. Taylor") and Edward Steven
Deli ("Mr. Deli") were charged with the two murders and with
various other criminal counts.
A preliminary hearing was held on January 8th, 1991. Both
defendants were bound over for trial on all counts. (R., Prelim.
Hr' g, p. 134-135.) On May 1, 1991, Mr. Taylor pled guilty to two
counts of capital murder. All other charges were dropped.
The capital homicide sentencing phase began on May 14, 1991
with the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The sentencing phase
lasted until May 22, 1991 with the jury returning a verdict
imposing a sentence of death on Count I, and a sentence of death
on Count II.
On July 8, 1992, Mr. Taylor filed his opening brief. In
response to that brief, the State filed a Motion and accompanying
Memorandum of Points and Authorities seeking to strike
Appellant' s Brief and to Disqualify Defense Counsel. On
September 23, 1993, this Court denied the State' s Motion to
Strike, but granted its Motion to Disqualify Defense Counsel,
stating that it appeared that defense counsel has breached Rule
1.7(b)1 and Rule 1.8(b)2 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct. As a result of this breach, this Court disqualified
defense counsel, Mr. Levine, from any further participation in
the instant case.
On November 24, 1993, Mr. Taylor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Brief of Appellant. On July 20, 1994, Appellant's brief filed by
Mr. Levine is ordered withdrawn by this Court.
On November 24, 1993, Mr. Taylor also filed a Motion to
Remand for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
On July 20, 1994, this case was remanded to the trial court for a
23(b) hearing to take evidence on the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
The 23(b) hearing began on May 15, 1995 before the Honorable
Frank G. Noel. The hearing continued until May 24, 1995. Judge
Noel filed a Memorandum Decision for the 23(b) hearing on June 9,
1995.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 1.7(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonable
believes the representation [sic] will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents
after consultation."
Rule 1.8(b) states that " [a] lawyer shall not use the
information relating to the representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after
consultation."
Mr. Taylor's plea should be set aside due to Mr. Levine's
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Taylor pled guilty to two
counts of first degree murder after Mr. Levine misinformed both
Mr. Taylor and his father, Tom Taylor, that evidence of the
dismissed charges would not be introduced at the penalty phase.
Because Mr. Taylor relied upon Mr. Levine's erroneous advice, his
plea was rendered involuntary and should be set aside.
Secondly, Mr. Taylor's plea was rendered involuntary and the
outcome of this case was prejudiced because Mr. Levine had an
active conflict of interest. Mr. Levine's philosophy about the
role of defense attorney's directly conflicted with his duty to
represent Mr. Taylor. Mr. Levine stated to the jury in the
penalty phase and to reporters that he believes in helping
defendants admit their wrong and get the right punishment. This
philosophy created a conflict of interest with Mr. Levine's duty
to represent Mr. Taylor.
Thirdly, Mr. Levine's compensation created another conflict
of interest at both the guilty plea and the penalty phase.
Because Mr. Levine was being paid a flat fee for his services as
Summit County public defender, his motivation was to plead Mr.
Taylor guilty and to spend a minimal amount of time preparing for
the penalty phase. This conflict deprived Mr. Taylor of his
constitutional right to conflict free counsel.
In addition, the cumulative errors committed by trial
counsel in preparation for and during the penalty phase rendered
the verdict unreliable, arbitrary and capricious and violated the
constitutional requirements in a death penalty case.
ARGUMENT
I. MR. TAYLOR'S GUILTY PLEA SHOULD BE SET ASIDE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW PENALTY
PHASE, BECAUSE MR. LEVINE'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TAINTED
MR. TAYLOR' S GUILTY PLEA, HIS PHILOSOPHY CONFLICTED WITH HIS
ROLE AS MR. TAYLOR' S ADVOCATE, AND HIS INADEQUATE
COMPENSATION CREATED A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
pursuant to the sixth amendment, a defendant generally must show
that trial counsel' s performance was deficient in that it "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
Mr. Levine' s performance as defense attorney failed in three
respects during Mr. Taylor's court proceedings. First, Mr.
Levine failed to adequately inform, and in fact, misinformed Mr.
Taylor about the consequences of his guilty plea. Second, Mr.
Levine' s philosophy about the role of defense attorney' s
conflicted with his duty to Mr. Taylor and prejudiced the outcome
of this case. Finally, Mr. Levine's inadequate compensation
created an active conflict of interest which violated Mr.
Taylor' s sixth amendment right to conflict-free counsel.
A. MR. TAYLOR' S PLEA SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN DUE TO MR.
LEVINE' S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Because Mr. Levine failed to inform Mr. Taylor of the
charges and evidence against him and because he misrepresented
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the consequences of the guilty plea, Mr. Taylor' s plea should be
withdrawn. The two-part standard of Strickland described supra
also applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims that
arise during the plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57
(1985); Laycock v. State of New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir.
1989). "In the context of a guilty plea, [Taylor] can satisfy
the first prong of the Strickland test if he proves that
counsel' s 'advice was not within the wide range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Bailey v. Cowley, 914
F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting Laycock, 880 F.2d at
1187) (alteration inserted). In addition, "[a] defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that "'counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistancef.]'"
United States v. Smith. 10 F.3d 724, 728 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689); accord Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1187;
State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186.
When counsel misrepresents to a client the implications of
his or her guilty plea, the advice is outside the realm of
competence required of criminal defense counsel. In discussing
examples of pleas rendered "involuntary," the United States
Supreme Court has stated:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the
direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or
his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats
(or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
very nature improper as having no proper relationship
to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970)(quoting Shelton
v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev' d on
other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). Thus, a misrepresentation of
the consequences of a guilty plea can render a plea involuntary
because of the ineffectiveness of counsel.
"The second prong [of the Strickland test] is met if
[Taylor] shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel' s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial." Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1187
(citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59) (alteration inserted).
In Mr. Taylor' s case, Mr. Levine told Mr. Taylor that if he
pled guilty to the two capital charges, the seven other counts
against him would be dropped and "the evidence supporting those
charges will not be allowed in trial against you, in the penalty
phase against you." (R., 23(b) Hr' g, vol. IV, p. 170, 11. 15-
17.) Mr. Levine's recount of his own advice to Mr. Taylor
regarding the guilty plea was, "[i]n essence, what you are
looking at is the same thing as if we were going to trial. You
are really not looking at any difference at all." (R., 23(b)
Hr' g, vol. 1, p. 112, 11. 15-18.)
Mr. Levine' s characterization of the sentencing phase as
being identical to the guilt phase is a misrepresentation of the
law. The Utah Code provides that in the sentencing phase of a
capital case that "[a]ny evidence the court deems to have
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probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-207 (1953 as amended). In reality, instead of less evidence
being admitted at the sentencing phase, it was likely that more
evidence would be admitted under Utah law.
Secondly, Mr. Levine admits that he told Mr. Taylor that at
the sentencing phase that "[a]t best, all we could hope to do
would be to keep out a lot of the blood and gore, a lot of the
blood and gore exhibits we'd be able to keep out." (R., 23(b)
Hr' g, vol. I, p. 113, 11. 2-5.)
Mr. Levine acknowledged that he did not know what he would
keep out, "because he did not know what the State totally was
going to introduce." (R., 23(b) Hr' g, vol. I, p. 117, 11. 16-
17.) Mr. Levine could have filed a bill of particulars and a
motion for discovery for the penalty phase to find out exactly
what evidence the prosecution intended to introduce, but he did
not. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 131, 1. 13.)
Similarly, Mr. Taylor' s father, Tom Taylor, who Levine
admits discussing the plea with, (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 104,
1. 19.), recalled that Mr. Levine had informed him that only the
witnesses who were "directly concerned with the capital homicide"
would be called. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 126, 11. 5-7.)
Tom Taylor states that when Judge Noel announced at the penalty
phase that "he was going to be lenient in the amount of witnesses
and witnesses that would be able to testify, the prosecution
could call, we [Tom and Mrs. Taylor] were shocked." (R., 23(b)
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Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 129, 11. 18-23.) At a break after the
announcement, Tom Taylor said that he approached Mr. Levine and
asked him why all the witnesses were going to testify. (R-,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 129, 11. 22-23) Tom Taylor stated that
Levine responded, "the Judge was allowing him to show character
and that there was nothing else that he could do about it." (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 130, 11. 2-5.) Tom Taylor had the same
understanding of the consequences of the guilty plea as Mr.
Taylor, that the evidence of the dropped charges would not be
allowed and witnesses would be limited.
Mr. Levine' s paralegal, who was hired for the Taylor case on
April 19, 1991, eleven days before the guilty plea was entered,
recalls Mr. Levine telling Mr. Taylor that the penalty phase
would be shorter than going to trial for the guilt phase. (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 25, 11. 10-21.) She also recalled that
Mr. Levine thought he could keep the "blood and gore" to a
minimum, and that "[t]hings [evidence] would be in, just not in
the detail as a long trial." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VI, p. 120,
11. 17-19.)(alteration inserted).
From these varied versions of the advice that Mr. Levine
gave Mr. Taylor, it seems that at a minimum, Mr. Levine really
was unsure of what would occur at the penalty phase. Mr. Levine
did, however, indicate to his client that if he plead guilty, the
evidence admitted in the penalty phase could be limited in
comparison with the evidence which would come in during the
guilt/innocence phase. In addition, his characterizations of
12
what the penalty phase would consist of is not consistent with
Utah law.
After the 23(b) remand, Judge Noel prepared a Memorandum
Decision which found that "Levine did not advise Taylor, prior to
the entry of his guilty plea, that in the penalty phase there
would be no evidence of the dismissed charges." (R., Memorandum
Decision 23B Remand Hr'g, p. 9, f 1.) Judge Noel based this
finding on the fact that when the guilty plea was entered, Mr.
Taylor was present when the prosecutor said the State was going
to introduce evidence of the dismissed charges. (R., Memorandum
Decision 23B Remand Hr'g, p. 8, f 2.)
The trial court' s finding is clearly erroneous. Mr. Taylor
is not sophisticated in legal matters. He had pled guilty to
aggravated burglary years earlier in Washington County, and when
questioned about the dismissed counts by Mr. Voros, Mr. Taylor
clearly did not understand that part of his restitution for the
case resulted from some of the dismissed charges. Mr. Taylor
testified, "I was never told what the restitution would be used
for." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. V, p. 49, 11. 10-11.) Later in the
hearing, Mr. Voros asked Mr. Taylor if during the entry of the
guilty plea it was obvious that Judge Noel might rule against Mr.
Levine's objections to the dismissed charges evidence. Mr.
Taylor repeatedly answered Mr. Voros that he took Mr. Levine' s
advice and understood, based on that advice, that the evidence
would not be admitted. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. V, pp. 61-66.)
Finally, with regards to the second prong of the test in
13
this area, Mr. Taylor clearly relied on Mr. Levine' s
characterizations of the penalty phase when he made the decision
to plead guilty. At the 23(b) remand hearing, Mr. Taylor said
that he made the decision to enter a guilty plea because Mr.
Levine told him that the evidence would be limited to evidence
directly related to the murders, and not the other charges. (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, pp. 170-173; vol. V, p. 8, 1. 2.) Once Mr.
Taylor realized who was being called to testify against him at
the penalty phase, he asked Mr. Levine why they were allowed and
was told it was "[bjecause the Judge ruled they could." (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 180, 11. 1-3.) When Mr. Taylor reminded
Mr. Levine that he had told him they would not be allowed to
testify, Mr. Levine responded, "we can appeal it." (R., 23(b)
Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 180, 11. 4-5.) There is no legal basis for
limiting the evidence of the dismissed counts, unless there had
been a plea bargain to that effect. Of course, Mr. Levine* s
comments that Mr. Taylor could appeal the ruling are correct, but
without a legal basis the appeal would be meaningless.
Given Mr. Levine' s mischaracterizations about what would
occur at the penalty phase, Mr. Taylor' s plea was rendered
involuntary.
Mr. Levine' s characterization of the guilty plea is that it
was only entered because Mr. Taylor wanted to spare himself, his
family, and the victims from the difficulties of a trial. (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. II, p. 192, 11. 18-25.) Mr. Taylor conceded at
the 23(b) evidentiary hearing that he did not want to put his
14
family through a trial, but had not informed Mr. Levine of this
particular motivation. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. V, p. 9, 11. 15-
17.)
Any defendant who pleads guilty is likely acting because of
a number of motivations, and sparing oneself and ones family a
trial is probably a common reason. However, in Mr. Taylor' s
case, he had been given misleading information by his trial
counsel. Mr. Taylor has testified that if he had understood the
actual way in which the penalty phase was conducted, he would not
have pled guilty. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. 5, 1. 5.) Had Mr.
Taylor known the accurate consequences of a guilty plea, any
desire to protect his family from a trial would have fallen away.
Mr. Levine' s misrepresentation to Mr. Taylor and his family
of the evidence that would be allowed in the penalty phase
constituted 'advice [that] was not within the wide range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' " Bailey v.
Cowley, 914 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting Laycock, 880
F.2d at 1187) (alteration inserted). In addition, Mr. Taylor
testified that there was at least a "reasonable probability that,
but for counsel' s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." Laycock, 880 F.2d at
1187 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). Mr. Taylor has met the
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel during
the guilty plea process and given this violation of his sixth
amendment right to counsel, his plea should be set aside.
Furthermore, Mr. Levine's inaccurate advice rendered Mr. Taylor's
15
plea involuntary, an additional basis for Mr. Taylor' s plea to be
withdrawn.
B. MR. LEVINE' S PHILOSOPHY ABOUT THE ROLE OF DEFENSE
ATTORNEY'S CONFLICTED WITH HIS DUTY TO REPRESENT MR.
TAYLOR AND RESULTED IN AN INVOLUNTARY PLEA AND
PREJUDICED THE OUTCOME IN THE SENTENCING PHASE
The two-part Strickland test applies in most ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. However, "[a] defendant can pursue
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by showing that
counsel had an actual conflict of interest." United States v.
Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1518 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Osborn
v. Shillinger. 861 F.2d 612, 626 (10th Cir. 1988)).
When a conflict of interest claim is advanced, "there are
special considerations that apply." United States v. Martin. 965
F.2d 839, 842 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Winkle,
722 F.2d 605, 609 (10th Cir. 1983)). Specifically, "«a defendant
who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the
adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in
order to obtain relief.'" Osborn, 861 F.2d at 626 (quoting Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 349-350 (1980)(other citation
omitted)). "The court will presume the defendant was prejudiced
by the lawyer' s performance." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,
488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(citing United States v. Cronic. 466 U.S.
648, 658 (1984)).
"In order to establish an actual conflict, [a defendant]
must demonstrate as a threshold matter . . . that the defense
attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own interest
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to the detriment of his client' s interests." United States v.
Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1518 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotations omitted)(alteration in original)(ellipses in
original)(citations omitted). Alternatively, a defendant can
show that "defense counsel's performance was adversely affected
by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly
valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to
defense counsel, but it was inherently in conflict with his
duties to others or to his own personal interests." United
States v. Bowie. 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990)(citing
Brien v. United States. 695 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1982) and
Porter v. Wainwriqht. 805 F.2d 930, 939-40 (11th Cir. 1986) ,
cert, denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987)).
In closing arguments of the penalty phase, Mr. Levine gave
what is now known as the "L.A. Law Speech." Levine stated:
In opening arguments I told you that the decision to do
this [plead guilty] came as a result of long hours of
conversation between myself and Mr. Taylor. Let me
tell you a little bit about my approach as a defense
attorney. And this stuck in my head last week, last
Thursday, I think. I got home very late, walked in my
house, and what happens to be on TV but LA Law,
something I don't regularly watch. But I don't even
know what the character was. She was talking to a
judge or something and she was explaining to the judge
an obligation as a criminal defense attorney, and that
is to do what I can to get my client off. In my
opinion that's a bunch of bull. You don't do yourself
any good, I don' t do my client any good and I don' t do
the system any good. I don' t feel that is my task as a
defense attorney. And I feel very sorry if that' s how
TV is portraying defense attorneys.
My approach differs in that normally what I try and do, I
talk to my client, I need to know whether or not they
committed that crime. I also need to know whether in the
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processing of that criminal through the system their
constitutional rights were protected. And if that' s the
case then I feel it' s my obligation to get that person to
take the first step, and that is to come forth, admit their
wrong doing, then to get them through the system in a sense
that the appropriate punishment is imposed and they live
with that punishment. That's exactly what I've done in Mr.
Taylor' s case. And that' s where Mr. Taylor differs from the
other individual [co-defendant] in this case.
(R., Capital Homicide Sentencing Phase: Jury Certification and.
Hearing, vol. V, pp. 865-66.) "An attorney who acts upon a
belief that his client should be convicted fails 'to function in
any meaningful sense as the Government's adversary.'" State v.
Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1994) (Holland II)(quoting
Chronic, 466 U.S. at 666). In addition, "[i]f an attorney's
loyalty is compromised because he believes that his client should
be convicted or because he is influenced by a conflict in
loyalties to another defendant, third parties, or the government,
the law cannot tolerate the risk that the attorney will fail to
subject the prosecution' s case to the kind of adversarial
challenge necessary to ensure that the accused receives the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment." Id. (emphasis added).
Mr. Levine claimed during the 23(b) remand hearing that in
fact, he lied to the jury, and does not hold the beliefs
expressed in the "L.A. Law" speech about the role of defense
counsel. (R. , 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 92, 11. 19-22.) However,
Mr. Levine has articulated views similar to the L.A. Law speech
to the media. If Mr. Levine truly does not hold these improper
views, it: seems odd that he would repeat the views to reporters.
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For example, in an article published in the Los Angeles
Times on Sunday, July 31st, 1994, Mr. Levine was quoted as
saying,"I have a somewhat different viewpoint of the criminal
defense attorney's role." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 139, 11.
20-25.) Mr. Levine confirmed that those were his statements
during the 23(b) hearing. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 140, 1.
1.) Another portion of the Los Angeles Times articles states,
[pjeople always complain that the legal system drags on,
especially in death penalty cases, because defense attorneys just
never stop. Levine more or less agreed. 'Arguing that your
client' s momma ruined his synapses by giving him too much cocoa
when he was a baby, that went too far.'" (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol.
VII, p. 140, 11. 4-12.) Again, Mr. Levine acknowledged that
these quotations were accurate representations of his comments to
the reporter. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 141, 11. 1-2.)
It has only been since his views about the role of defense
attorneys have been challenged by this Court and the media that
Mr. Levine has found it necessary to modify his views.
Mr. Levine also appears to have a distinct philosophy about
the use of experts in mitigation that adversely affected Mr.
Taylor' s interests. Mr. Levine described the utilization of
experts to support a theory as "like going for a back street
abortion. We' 11 find a back street expert to back up any theory
that they want. I believe in using credible experts, and that' s
all I'm saying." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 153, 11. 19-23.)
This statement, coupled with his statement in the L.A. Times
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article that "arguing that his mom gave him cocoa while he was a
baby, that went too far . . . [a]rguing that his mama ruined his
synapses . . ." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 153, 11. 4-6.)
indicates that Mr. Levine has a negative attitude towards
psychological evidence. Mr. Levine asserted that he did not know
of "mitigation experts" who assist attorneys in preparing for the
penalty phase of a capital case. But Mr. Levine did point out
that he felt "that they have other agendas." (R., 23(b) Hr'g,
vol. I, p. 183, 11. 16-21.) It is not entirely clear what Mr.
Levine meant by this statement, but it appears consistent with
his negative perception of any experts commonly used by criminal
defense attorneys in capital cases.
Given Mr. Levine' s statements about experts and
psychological evidence, the fact that he failed to investigate or
pursue any mitigating evidence seems entirely consistent with his
improper philosophy about his role as defense attorney.
At the 23(b) Hearing, many of the reports that Mr. Levine
had available for the preparation of the sentencing phase were
reviewed. In a report prepared by an appointed alienist in the
case, Dr. Moench, there was documentation of substance abuse (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 39, 11. 15-17), recommendations by school
authorities in third grade that Mr. Taylor get psychological help
after he tore up a classroom (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 47, 11.
12-14.), evidence of a learning disorder (R., 23 (b) Hr'g, vol.
IV, p. 52, 11. 18-22.), teasing and taunting because of a
disfiguring facial scar (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 54, 11. 14-
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18.), an older brother with serious alcohol and drug abuse
problems (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 45, 11. 18-20.), and that
he may have been clinically depressed when charged with
aggravated burglary in 1990 (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 57, 11.
12-15.). In Mr. Taylor's written confession of the St. George
burglary, he wrote "' [t]otally fucking crazy. I want to kill
myself to put this out of my mind. My mind, it tells me, to die,
die, die.'" (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 40, 11. 7-10.) Dr.
Moench also noted in her report that his psychological testing
"showed him to be irritable, depressed and shy," (R., 23(b)
Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 42, 11. 5-7.) the testing also reflected an
"inability to delay gratification or control impulses." (R.,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 42, 11. 14-16.)
While it is not required that an attorney put on all of this
potentially mitigating evidence in every penalty phase, it is
required that this information be thoroughly investigated. Once
a thorough investigation and educated evaluation of the evidence
is made, a tactical decision not to put the evidence on would be
appropriate. However, in this case, when Mr. Levine was asked
whether the psychological effects of the facial scar could be
mitigating, he responded, "[w]ithout a psychological expert, I
would say no." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 44, 11. 19-22.)
Yet, Mr. Levine failed to consult an independent expert to
evaluate potentially mitigating evidence. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol.
IV, p. 45, 11. 14-15.) Acknowledging that he was not competent
to make psychological evaluations and yet, failing to consult
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with someone who could, resulted in deficient performance on Mr.
Levine' s part. He made the decision not to pursue potentially
mitigating evidence without understanding the evidence he was
rejecting.
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must
be whether counsel' s conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result." State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357
(Utah 1994)(Holland II)(Stewart. J. and Durham, J., concurring);
see also Smith, 10 F.3d at 728.
Mr. Levine' s beliefs about the role of defense attorney' s
and the death penalty process created an actual conflict of
interest which violated Mr. Taylor' s right to conflict-free
counsel. Given this violation of his rights, Mr. Taylor
respectfully requests that this Court allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea and remand this case for a new trial.
Even if this Court were to find that Mr. Levine' s beliefs
did not rise to the level of an active conflict of interest, Mr..
Levine' s performance was still deficient under Strickland and his
performance prejudiced Mr. Taylor. The improper closing
arguments consisting of the "L.A. Law" speech, Mr. Levine's
failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, and Mr.
Levine' s failure to adequately prepare for the penalty phase all
constituted deficient performance. Mr. Levine' s performance was
so lacking that the jury had nothing to rely on but the
prosecution's presentation of the aggravating circumstances.
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C. MR. LEVINE'S COMPENSATION WAS INADEQUATE, CREATING A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AT BOTH THE PLEA AND SENTENCING
STAGES AND DEPRIVING MR. TAYLOR OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 790 (La. 1993), the
Louisiana Supreme Court found "that because of . . . excessive
caseloads and the insufficient support with which their attorneys
must work, indigent defendants . . . are generally not provided
with effective assistance of counsel the constitution requires."
A similar dilemma was addressed in Recorder' s Court v. Wayne
Circuit Court. 503 N.W. 2d 885 (Mich. 1993):
The incentive, if a lawyer is not paid to spend more
time with and for the client, is to put in as little
time as possible for the pay allowed. Under the
current system, a lawyer can earn $100 an hour for a
guilty plea, whereas if he or she goes to trial the
earning may be $15 an hour or less.
In short, the system of reimbursement of assigned
counsel as it now exists creates a conflict of interest
between the attorney' s need to be paid fully for his
services and the full panoply of rights for the client.
Only the very conscientious will do the later against
his or her interests.
During the representation of Taylor, Mr. Levine was acting
as a public defender for Summit County, State of Utah. (R.,
Memorandum Decision 23B Remand Hr'g, p. 2, H 3.) Mr. Levine was
paid $1,000 per month for representation of adults and juveniles
in criminal matters and Summit County Jail inmates with civil
actions. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 32, 11. 20-24; p. 35, 11.
10-11; p. 37, 11. 1.) From January 1, 1991 through the end of
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May, 1991, Mr. Levine estimated he spent approximately eighty-
five percent of his time in Summit County working as a public
defender. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 60, 11. 2-8.) During the
time that Mr. Levine worked as the public defender for Summit
County, he was responsible for his own costs, including travel,
office space, support staff, and the general overhead costs of
maintaining a law practice. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 36, 1.1.
148-18.)
During the 23(b) hearing, Mr. Levine estimated the amount of
time he was spending on cases for Summit county from January 1991
to May of 1991. Given that he was being paid a thousand dollars
a month, Mr. Levine admitted he was probably making between seven
and nine dollars an hour while working on the Taylor case. (R-,
23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 88, 11. 11-25; p. 89, 1. 1.) Had Mr.
Taylor not changed his plea and had proceeded to trial, Mr.
Levine could have conceivably made as little as two to three
dollars an hour. Mr. Levine repeatedly protested that he does
not "approach the practice of law, especially criminal law, from
a dollar and cents standpoint." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 88,
11. 4-6.) Mr. Levine claimed at the 23(b) hearing that the
amount he was being paid had no impact on his work and that money
just was not important to him. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. II, p. 165,
11. 18-24.) However, if money was truly not important to Mr.
Levine personally, his philosophy that it is wasteful to spend
money on capital cases would also create a conflict of interest
with regard to Mr. Taylor. This philosophy was reflected in a
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letter to the editor sent to the Salt Lake Tribune, August 26th,
1994. Mr. Levine wrote in response to the imposition of Rule 8
qualifications for capital defense, and argued that citizens tax
dollars were being diverted from schools, education and health
and were being given to defense lawyers. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol.
II, p. 97, 11. 10-25; p. 98, 11. 1-12.) This letter was written
approximately eight months after Mr. Levine had been disqualified
from this case for violations of the professional rules of
conduct. Again, it is difficult to determine what Mr. Levine' s
actual philosophy about compensation was at any given time, but
Mr. Levine' s voluntary statements to the press repeatedly reveal
a philosophy contradictory to that which Mr. Levine has testified
to.
It is also important to note that Mr. Levine did send a
subsequent bill to Summit County on May 21st, 1994, for his
services in the Taylor case. Again, at the time that the bill
was submitted, Mr. Levine had been removed from the case by this
Court. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. II, p. 106, 11. 15-25; p. 107, 11.
1-2.) It is not entirely clear why Mr. Levine submitted this
bill almost eight months after he had been removed from the case,
but within a week of submitting the bill, he was criticizing the
imposition of Rule 8 by this Court and criticizing the diversion
of tax dollars to representation in capital cases.
Whatever Mr. Levine' s actual philosophy, the fact remains
that Mr. Levine failed to prepare for the penalty phase in Mr.
Taylor1 s case. What makes Mr. Levine' s lack of preparation for
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Mr. Taylor' s case even more disturbing is Mr. Levine' s
acknowledgment that he could have utilized experts, investigators
and paralegals and the county would have willingly paid them for
their services. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. II, p. 104, 11. 17-19.)
II. CUMULATIVE ERROR BY TRIAL COUNSEL AT THE PENALTY PHASE
RENDERED THE VERDICT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND FAILED TO
CHANNEL THE DISCRETION OF THE JURY
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
when a State authorizes capital punishment, the State has a
constitutional responsibility to ensure that the death penalty is
not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See, e.g..
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia. 428
U.S. 153 (1976). This Court has stated that *[t]o be effective
an attorney 'must play the role of an active advocate, rather
than a mere friend of the court." State v. Holland, 1996 WL 4429
(Utah Jan. 4, 1996) (Holland IHWquoting Evitts v. Luce, 469 U.S.
387, 394 (1985). In State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994)
(Holland II), this Court also noted, "' [w]hen the trial or
sentencing process is rendered unreliable because it has clearly
lost its adversary character, the Sixth Amendment violation is
clear.'" (quoting Osborn v. Shillinger. 861 F.2d 612, 625 (10th
Cir. 1988).
In addition to the errors outlined in the sections above,
Mr. Levine utterly failed to fulfill his role as an advocate for
Mr. Taylor, resulting in a violation of Mr. Taylor' s Sixth,
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Eighth and Fourteenth amendment rights. With regards to the
penalty phase, Mr. Levine failed to adequately prepare. Mr.
Levine failed to investigate potentially mitigating evidence,
failed to adequately prepare Mr. Taylor and his father, Tom
Taylor to take the stand, and Mr. Levine did not file any
pleadings which would have assisted in his preparation for the
penalty phase.
Mr. Levine's failure to prepare for the penalty phase was
reflected in testimony given at the 23(b) hearing. Joan Watt
("Ms. Watt"), Chief Appellate Counsel at Salt Lake Legal
Defenders testified at the 23(b) hearing as an expert in capital
defense cases. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. 6, p. 30, 11. 13-17.) Her
testimony mostly involved professional norms in 1991, the year in
which Mr. Taylor' s plea was entered and the penalty phase took
place. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. 6, p. 30, 11. 13-15.) Ms. Watt
testified that she had been directly involved in three capital
cases and had attended two capital case seminars prior to 1991.
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. 6, p. 36, 11. 20-23, p. 37, 11. 1-10.) Ms.
Watt described the general procedure that attorneys should follow
when representing a capital defendant. Ms. Watt noted, "from day
one, you need to begin investigating your penalty phase. You
immediately get records that cover your client' s entire life."
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. 6, p. 42, 11. 21-23.) In describing the
varying types of mitigating evidence that needs to be
investigated, Ms. Watt mentioned mental health, substance abuse,
juvenile records, prison and jail records, unadjudicated prior
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conduct, in addition to any enumerated mitigating evidence
provided in the capital sentencing statute. (R., 23(b) Hr'g,
vol. 6, p. 41-43.) Ms. Watt testified that she had even received
a checklist for items to be used in mitigation as early in 1989
at a capital case seminar. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, p. 46, 11. 3-4.)
Ms. Watt also testified about the 1989 American Bar
Association standards that set out guidelines for defense
attorneys representing capital defendants. Ms. Watt noted that
the guidelines recommend an extensive mitigation investigation,
very similar to that which was described supra. (R», 23(b) Hr'g,
p. 49, 11. 4-18.)
Mr. Levine testified at the 23(b) hearing that in
preparation for the penalty phase, "we had psychiatric
evaluations that were taken." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 199,
1. 15-16.) These evaluations were prepared by court appointed
alienists not for mitigation purposes, but for evaluating an
insanity plea and competence. Although Mr. Levine testified that
he thought some psychiatric reports may have been introduced at
the penalty phase (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 200, 11. 1-2),
there is no indication of any such reports being introduced. Mr.
Levine also testified that he made no independent inquiries as to
Mr. Taylor's school, mental or health history. (R., 23(b) Hr'g,
p. 209, 11. 6-23.) Mr. Taylor testified that
Mr. Levine finally decided to hire a paralegal to assist him
in the case eleven days prior to Mr. Taylor entering his plea.
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 25, 11. 10-21.) Although the
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paralegal, Robbie Levine, testified that there were multiple
meetings discussing a possible guilty plea, (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol.
VI, p. 114, 1. 15.), she acknowledged on cross-examination that
her first meeting with Mr. Taylor had taken place on May 1, 1991,
the day the plea was entered. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 30,
1. 1.) Robbie Levine testified that during the eleven days prior
to Mr. Taylor's guilty plea, she and Mr. Levine had not developed
a trial strategy. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 49, 1. 20-25.)
As far as the development of a mitigation case for Mr. Taylor,
Robbie Levine testified that she spoke with Mr. Levine, read the
file, and spoke with the investigators involved in the case.
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VII, p. 26.) None of the activities
described by Ms. Watt appear to have been undertaken in any
substantial way by either Mr. Levine or his paralegal.
Mr. Levine did testify that he thought Mr. Taylor and his
father would be the best mitigating evidence. However,when Mr.
Levine advised Mr. Taylor to testify and he was exposed to cross
examination, the results were disastrous. Mr. Taylor' s cross
examination portrayed him to the jury as unemotional, he failed
to recall the shootings, and undermined Mr. Levine' s one approach
to the penalty phase; to portray Mr. Taylor as honest. (R.,
Capital Homicide Sentencing Phase: Jury Certification and
Hearing, vol. IV, p. 775-818.) Mr. Levine was aware of Mr.
Taylor' s difficulty in communicating, and in fact had received
psychiatric reports describing Mr. Taylor as "aloof, shy &
withdrawn." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 85, 1. 1.) Mr. Taylor
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testified that Mr. Levine spent approximately ten minutes
preparing him for his testimony at the penalty phase. (R., 23(b)
Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 176, 1.5.) Furthermore, putting Mr. Taylor on
the stand was unnecessary; he had a statutory right to
allocution. cite.
During the penalty phase, the prosecution called eleven
witnesses to present aggravating circumstance evidence and
testimony about the crime and investigation. Mr. Levine called
three witnesses. According to Mr. Taylor, James Lewis Holland
("Mr. Holland" ) was called by Mr. Levine to demonstrate that Mr,.
Holland was the type who deserved the death penalty, not Mr.
Taylor. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, p. 176, 11. 23-24.) Mr. Holland gave
seven transcribed pages of testimony about his life history and
life in prison. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 748-755.) The only
other witness besides Mr. Taylor was his father, Tom Taylor.
In sum, Mr. Levine failed to prepare of investigate for the
penalty phase, he failed to present any substantial mitigating
evidence, and the evidence which he did present was extremely
detrimental to Mr. Taylor' s case.
Another area in which Mr. Levine failed to represent Mr.
Taylor in an effective manner was his failure to file pleadings
which would have assisted counsel in properly preparing for the
penalty phase. Mr. Levine testified that he did not file a bill
of particulars for the penalty phase (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p.
131, 1. 17) and that no motions in limine were filed (R., 23(b)
Hr'g, vol. I, p. 123, 11. 8-21). Mr. Levine testified that he
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preferred to conduct a trial by ambush and surprise opposing
counsel by making his objections at the time of the hearing.
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. I, p. 123, 1. 8-21; vol. IV, p. 110, 11. 5'
13.)
For that reason, Mr Levine further testified, he did not
file a Motion in Limine so as to determine the admissibility of
the allegations set forth in the psychiatric report filed by Dr.
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 19, 1. 16.) Levine completely and
totally waived the introduction of testimony involving mental
state, or mental illness, or mental health history, (R., 23(b)
Hr'g, vol. IV, p. 17-20), during the penalty phase of the
hearing, out of fear that the evidence contained in the report
prepared by Dr. Moench listed above would come into evidence.
(R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. Ill, p. 76, 11. 18-22.)
When questioned during the Rule 23B remand hearing, Mr.
Levine could not explain to the Court under direct examination
the entire concept of prior bad acts evidence in the penalty
phase under the Laffertv decision previously decided by this
Court. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. IV. p. 16-20.) When questioned
during the same Rule 23B remand hearing, on direct examination,
Summit County Attorney Robert Adkins testified that despite the
inquiry of he Summit County Sheriff's Office, the State had no
independent evidence which would support the statements and
contents of the report and therefore none of the evidence that
Mr. Levine feared would so be prejudicial to Mr. Taylor during
the penalty phase would have been admissible. (R., 23(b) Hr'g,
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vol. VII, p. Ill, 11. 3-7.) Mr. Levine would have so discovered
this obvious fact had he bothered to complete even the most basic
inquiry and pursued the issue in defense of his client's life.
As stated above, Mr. Levine did not file any discovery requests
relating to the penalty phase of the proceedings whatsoever. As
a result, the only ambush which occurred in this matter occurred
when Mr. Levine completely and totally waived the opportunity to
present meaningful, sympathicic and crucial evidence concerning
the mental health history of Mr. Taylor to the jury. Mr. Levine
testified that he did so following a threat from the Summit
County Attorney to call Dr. Moench to the stand to testify as to
the contents of the complete report. By doing so, Mr. Levine
effectively waived all meaningful mitigation arguments that could
have been presented, due to a total misunderstanding of the
applicable law in effect at that time.
Ms. Watt testified at the 23(b) hearing that her experience
with capital cases suggested that "there is a need to file
discovery motions, to follow through on them, and to, at times,
ask for orders." (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VI, p. 54, 11. 1-3.) Ms.
Watt also described the difficulties that can be presented on
appeal when a prosecutor has an open file policy and the defense
attorney has failed to seek any discovery orders. (R., 23(b)
hr' g, vol. VI, p. 54, 11. 11-24.) Ms. Watt also described
various motions in limine that should be filed regarding
unadjudicated conduct, motions relevant to jury selection,
aggravating circumstances, co-defendant testimony and suppression
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issues. Although Ms. Watt acknowledged that an attorney need not
file every possible motion, that failure to file any of the above
described motions will impact the evidence that comes in and will
likely impact any plea negotiations. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol. VI,
p. 57.)
As a further indication of how little was done in
preparation for the penalty phase hearing, at the Rule 23B remand
hearing, Mr. Levine testfied that he was personally aware of the
angry mood of the community folowing the Deli verdict and yet did
nothing to counter the possibility of that public opinion by
renewing the Motion For Change of Venue and in fact directly
authorized the contiuation of the penalty phase hearing on the
day of Mr. Taylor's suicide attempt, without even moving for a
continuance for the benefit of his client. (R., 23(b) Hr'g, vol.
IV, p. 74, 11. 11-24.)
The previous sections also reviewed Mr. Levine' s improper
and prejudicial closing arguments. Most of the discussion
surrounding Mr. Levine's statements during the "L.A. Law" speech.
However, Mr. Levine' s improper remarks during closing arguments
went much further than this improper description of defense
counsel's role in a criminal case.
Not once during closing arguments did Mr. Levine say that
Mr. Taylor did not deserve the death penalty. In the closing
arguments by the prosecution, the attorney' s repeatedly asked the
jury to impose the death penalty. Mr. Christensen said, "I would
submit what' s right to do in this case is to impose the death
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penalty . . . " (R., Capital Homicide Sentencing Phase: Jury
Certification and Hr'g, vol. V, p. 823, 11. 4-5.) Mr.
Christensen repeatedly described the aggravating circumstances in
this case in great detail. He also described potential
mitigating circumstances and argued that they did not apply to
Mr. Taylor's case. (R., Capital Homicide Sentencing Phase: Jury
Certification and Hr'g, vol. V, p. 841-844.) Mr. Christensen
also attacked Mr. Levine' s approach in this case, calling Mr.
Taylor, "a man who is a liar." (R., Capital Homicide Sentencing
Phase: Jury Certification and Hr'g, vol. V, p. 849, 11. 23-24.)
Finally, at the end of Mr. Christensen' s closing arguments, he
again asks the jury to impose the death penalty. (R., Capital
Homicide Sentencing Phase: Jury Certification and Hr'g, vol. V,
p. 855-856.)
Mr. Levine follows Mr. Christensen' s closing argument with a
Native American story about an old man who created a woman and
child. There is no death in the world, but when the woman
decides to throw a rock into the water and it sinks, death has
been created in the world. (R-, Capital Homicide Sentencing
Phase: Jury Certification and Hr'g, vol. V, p. 857-859.) The
jury has just heard Mr. Christensen describe all of the reasons
why Mr. Taylor should get the death penalty, and Mr. Levine
responds with a story that has no apparent relevance to the case.
Mr. Levine goes on to discuss the difficulty of deciding on
a verdict, then Mr. Levine begins to discuss mitigating and
aggravating factors. Mr. Levine states, "[t]he youth of the
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defendant, Mr. Taylor, or the lack of prior criminal activity
cannot be weighed, as well as the other factors cannot be weighed
in any meaningful sense against the aggravating factors." (R.,
Capital Homicide Sentencing Phase: Jury Certification and Hr' g,
vol. V, p. 826, 11. 12-16.) Mr. Levine, in that statement, has
just told the jury that they should impose the death penalty.
The closest Mr. Levine gets to asking the jury to impose life is
when he states, "[t]here is nothing in the law that says you have
to impose the death penalty." (R., Capital Homicide Sentencing
Phase: Jury Certification and Hr'g, vol. V, p. 864, 11. 15-17.)
Mr. Levine' s closing argument is followed by Mr. Adkin' s
closing argument, which again tells the jury that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The jury
had one viewpoint placed in front of them. Mr. Levine had
utterly failed to act as an advocate for his client, for Mr.
Taylor, the sentencing phase failed to be an adversary
proceeding.
In sum, Mr. Levine' s performance in this case so tainted the
outcome of the proceedings, that the death penalty was imposed in
an arbitrary and capricious manner. Mr. Levine improperly
advised his client, did not adequately prepare for the guilt or
penalty phase, made grave errors in judgment due to his improper
philosophy about his role as defense counsel, and utterly failed
to act as an advocate for his client.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing, it is requested that findings of Judge
Noel following the Rule 23B remand be overturned by this Court
and that the entry of pleas of guilty to the charges as set forth
above by the Defendant Von Lester Taylor be set aside and that
this matter be remanded for a full trial on the merits before the
lower Court. In the alternative, it is requested that this Court
order a new penalty phase be conducted before the lower Court for
the reasons as set forth above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tfcis—^Etjday offline,/ 1996.
/J. B&UCE SAVAGE, JR.
'Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, i
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
OF DEATH
vs !
VON LESTER TAYLOR, : Criminal No. 1300
Defendant. t
On the 24th day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Frank G. Noel,
appeared Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney and Terry L.
Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney, the attorneys for the
State of Utah, and the defendant appeared in person and by counsel,
Elliott Levine.
The defendant having pled guilty to Count I, Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the First Degree, a Capital felony, and Count II, Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a Capitol felony, and a Penalty
Phase Hearing before a Jury having been held on May 16, 17, 21, and
22, 1991, the Jury after deliberation, unanimously determined that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that a sentence of death was
justified and appropriate as to both Counts I and II, and should be
imposed, and the Court on May 24, 1991, having inquired of the
defendant if there was any legal or factual reason why judgment
should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
being shown or appearing to the Court,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the offense in
Count I, Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital
felony, and the sentence of death is hereby imposed,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the offense in
Count II, Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital
felony, and the sentence of death is hereby imposed.
IT IS ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the defendant be transported to the
Utah State Prison where in not less than 30 nor more than 60 days
immediately following the date of the entry of this Judgment, the
Warden of the Utah State Prison is directed to put to death the
defendant by lethal intravenous injection on the 12th day of July,
1991.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a complete record and transcript of all
proceedings held in this matter be prepared immediately for
certification and transmittal to the Utah State Supreme Court; and a
statement of the conviction and judgment be prepared and transmitted
to the Chairman of the Utah State Board of Pardons immediately after
entry of this judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Warrant duly signed and attested by
the Clerk under the seal of the Court shall be drawn and delivered to
Fred D. Eley, Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, and that the
Sheriff shall deliver the Warrant and Certified Copy of this Judgment
to the Warden of the Utah State Prison at the time of delivering the
defendant to the Prison. Upon execution of the sentence as ordered
by this Court, the Warden shall return upon said Warrant showing the
time, place and manner in which it was executed and return the same
to the Court.
IT IS ORDERED that D. Fred Eley, the Sheriff of Summit County,
State of Utah, take the defendant, VON LESTER TAYLOR, and deliver the
said defendant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah,
where said defendant shall then and there be confined and imprisoned
in accordance with this Judgment and Sentence of Death.
DATED this day of May, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they mailed the requisite
mmber of true and correct copies of the foregoing document, postage
prepaid, on this 24th day of January, 1992, to:
*. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UTAH
236 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114
Addendum 2
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VON LESTER TAYLOR,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
23B REMAND HEARING
CASE NO. 911313001
Judge Frank G. Noel
This matter is before this court on a remand from the Utah Supreme Court under Rule
23B Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for the purpose ofentering findings of fact relevant to
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It should be noted that, in the coun's
view, this is a fact finding procedure. This court is not to make legal conclusions nor to enter
an order or judgment. The ultimate conclusion as to whether defense counsel provided effective
assistance will be made by the Supreme Court. However, the ultimate question of whether the
defendant received effective assistance ofcounsel as well as related questions regarding whether
defense counsel's actions fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment, and if not,
whether prejudice resulted are, in this court's view, mixed questions of fact and law. To the
extent that those issues are questions of fact the court will make findings accordingly.
This matter was heard over a seven day period during which the defendant and the State
presented evidence. After oral arguments the court took the matter under advisement and now
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finds that the defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel either at his trial or during the guilty plea process in District
Court.
The coun finds additional facts as follows:
Defendant's attorney in District Coun. Elliott Levine. was under a two year contract to
provide legal defender services for Summit County for the years 1989 and 1990. That contract
expired on December 31, 1990 but he had also obtained the two year contract with the county
for the years beginning January 1, 1991. The terms of this contract provided him with
compensation of 524,000.00 over the twenty-four month period of the contract and required him
to handle criminal matters for indigent defendants in Justice Coun, Circuit Coun, Juvenile Coun
(on rare occasions), District Coun and habeas corpus matters. His contract included capital
cases. He was allowed to have a private practice and there was no provision for reimbursement
for overhead. Levine did in fact have an ongoing practice in Salt Lake County. During the
critical months of January to May 1991 when he represented the defendant Von Lester Taylor
his contract with Summit County provided ten to twenty percent of his gross revenues. Levine's
overhead in 1991 for his entire practice was approximately Si,635.00 a month.
Levine was offered the Summit County contract on the basis of his being the low bidder.
The Summit County Commissioners themselves did not review Mr. Levine's qualifications. The
Commissioners relied upon recommendations by the County Clerk, the Commissioners did not
review whether Levine had handled any capital cases prior to the time they awarded the contract.
Over the years that Levine was under contract with Summit County' the Commissioners had
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received no complaints regarding Levine's qualifications or competence. Levine had always
received positive recommendations from the County Clerk. The first indication ofany challenge
to Levine's credentials or qualifications came as a result of this instant case at about the time
Levine was removed and the matter was reported in the media. Levine had handled only one
capital case prior to representing Taylor in this matter.
On December 24, 1990 an information was filed in the Circuit Coun in Summit County
charging the defendant with two counts ofFirst Degree Murder both capital felonies. Attempted
Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Arson, two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated
Robbery, Theft, Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop and Aggravated Assault. The
charges arose out of events that took place in Summit County on December 22, 1990. Upon
hearing of these events through the media Mr. Levine contacted the Summit County Sheriff and
the Summit County Attorney and subsequently undertook the representation of Mr. Taylor.
From January through May of 1991 when the defendant's penalty phase trial was
concluded Levine spent about eighty-five percent of his time on Summit County matters. A
minimum of eighty percent of that time was spent on the Taylor case. During this critical time
Levine averaged twenty-five to thirty hours a week on Summit County matters excluding driving
time from Salt Lake City to Coalville and back to Salt Lake City. Levine spent 110 to 130
hours per month on Summit matters. Of the 25 to 30 hours per week spent on Summit County
matters from January through May of 1991 Levine spent a minimum of fifty percent of his time
in actual consultation with either Mr. Taylor or Taylor's parents. Some of this time was
incurred by Levine's paralegal talking to Taylor while Levine sat through the Edward Deli trial.
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Levine did not keep billing sheets or time slips in connection with Taylor's matters.
On May 1, 1991 Taylor entered a plea of guilty to two Capital Homicide charges and the
remaining charges were dismissed. The penalty phase of his trial began on May 15, 1991, and
concluded on May 22, 1991 with a jury verdict of death.
The coun finds based on evidence presented by the defendant that from 1990 through
1993, during the period of time Levine was under contract with the County, Levine had opened
262 criminal files. No evidence was offered with regard to the number of misdemeanors as
opposed to the number of felonies, nor with regard to how many of those cases had been closed
and how many were pending during Levine's representation of Taylor. The coun did not allow
that kind of testimony if it was based on an examination of the contents of the flies themselves,
because of the attorney/client privilege between the persons who are the subject of those files
and their attorney Elliott Levine. That information would have been available, however, by an
examination of public records in Summit County. Apparently that kind of an examination was
not completed and accordingly the evidence regarding Levine's workload at the time of his
representation of Taylor was sketchy at best.
The findings of fact entered hereafter will be done so in the context of the three theories
that defendant relies upon in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant's first theory is that Levine's personal philosophy as to the role of defense counsel
in a criminal case is at odds with the true role of defense counsel and therefore results in a
conflict of interest. Secondly, Taylor asserts that Levine's advice to him during the guilty plea
process was in error and that he relied upon that advice in entering his plea. Lastly Taylor
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argues that Levine's compensation from Summit County was so meager that Levine was not able
to devote the time and attention necessary to this case and that a conflict was thereby created
between Levine's own personal interests and Taylor's interests, and further that Levine failed
to follow certain courses of action that should have been followed if a reasonably professional
defense had been provided Mr. Taylor.
The landmark case in determining questions of ineffective assistance of counsel is
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland the court ruled that a defendant
must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the test articulated in Strickland. In addition,
our Supreme Court stated in State v. Holland. 876, P.2d 357 (Utah 1994) that ". . .the
benchmark for judging any claim for ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon
as having produced a just result." Against this legal background the court will now make
findings relating to defendant's three theories for relief.
LEVINE'S PERSONAL PHn,OSOPHY OF THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL.
This issue was precipitated by defense counsel's comments to the jury in his closing
argument wherein he stated that his approach to criminal defense differed from other defense
attorneys in that he felt an obligation to have his clients come forth, admit their wrongdoing and
then to get them through the system so that an appropriate punishment is imposed and to help
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defendant live with that punishment.
These comments to the jury have been referred to throughout the proceedings as the "LA
Law Speech". This view of defense counsel's role is clearly at odds with the true role of
criminal defense counsel to zealously and loyally represent his clients interests throughout the
proceeding within the boundaries of law and ethics. The factual question then is not whether
the statement attributed to Mr. Levine was in fact made to the jury, as the record clearly reflects
that it was. but whether Levine's statements truly reflect his personal belief as to the role of
defense counsel, and therefore may have acted in a manner contrary to Taylor's interests.
Mr. Levine's unrebutted testimony is that his own philosophy is that he should zealously
and loyally represent his clients interests within the boundaries of law and ethics, and that it is
not his approach to get his clients to "come clean" admit their wrongdoing and accept their
punishment. The question then is why did Mr. Levine make the LA Law speech. It is
important to remember the context in which the speech was made. Taylor had already pled
guilty', and Levine's comments were made at the penalty phase.
Levine testified that he felt his comments would reflect favorably upon both he and the
defendant. Levine stated that in his view lay people perceive typical defense counsel in criminal
cases as being dishonest and willing to do anything possible to get their clients off. He reasoned
that his approach would distance himself from those typical defense attorneys and perhaps would
ingratiate himself to the jurors. Further, he reasoned, it would appear to the jury that Taylor
had indeed "owned up" to his deeds and was remorseful for what had occurred, perhaps casting
Taylor in a favorable light and hopefully making the difference between a life or a death
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sentence.
After having carefully considered Levine's testimony, viewing his demeanor on the
witness stand and considering all of the other matters that bear on this issue the court finds that
Levine's comments to the jury (the LA Law speech) do not reflect his personal philosophy as
to the role of defense counsel. His testimony to that effect was credible and unrebutted.
Moreover Taylor offered no evidence that Levine encouraged him to "come clean" and "accept
his punishment". There was no evidence whatsoever, by any witness, of this kind of
manipulation by Levine. Taylor's own testimony regarding Levine's advice on the guilty plea
is not that he was pressured to admit his wrongdoing, or manipulated but that he was given
incorrect information as will be discussed later.
Statements by Levine to the media do not in the opinion of the court suggest that Levine
does not personally believe that his duty is to zealously do everything he can to protect his
client's interest within the bounds of law and ethics.
Furthermore, the court cannot say that the LA Law speech itself prejudiced the defendant
in the minds of the jury. It must be noted that there was overwhelming evidence in this case
pointing to defendant's guilt. Faced with this evidence, a tactic to make the defendant appear
remorseful, contrite and repentant in the eyes of the jury and to ingratiate defense counsel with
the jury and distance himself from lawyers who will do anything to get their client off is within
the broad range of reasonable professional judgment.
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DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ADVICE DURING GUTLTY PLEA PROCESS.
Defendant claims and so testified that Levine advised him prior to the entry of his guilty
plea that in the penalty phase trial there would be no evidence relating to the charges that were
to be dismissed. Defendant further testified that he relied on that advice in entering his guilty
piea. On the other hand, Levine testified that he did not so advise Taylor but rather advised
Taylor that the trial in the penalty phase would be substantially similar to the guilt or innocent
trial and that the only difference would be that in the penalty phase he may be able to keep out
some of the inflammatory pictures showing the crime scenes and the bodies of the victims.
Taylor's testimony is undermined somewhat by the transcript of the colloquy between the
court and Taylor and defense counsel at the time of the entry of the guilty plea. There was a
discussion at that time with regard to evidence that the State intended to present at the penalty
phase regarding the dismissed charges. Mr. Adkins said that the State was intending to
introduce evidence of the dismissed charges. Mr. Levine was asked if he understood that that
was the State's intent and he responded that he was aware of the State's intent but intended to
make objections at the sentencing phase. This discussion occurred in the presence of the
defendant. The court then stated that this would be an issue that the court would have to rule
on at the trial. The court then asked the defendant on at least two different occasions during the
plea dialogue, whether he was satisfied with the legal representation he had received and he
responded in the affirmative. The court then made a finding based on the court's observations
of the defendant and the responses to the court's questions that the plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made.
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The court finds that Levine did not advise Taylor, prior to the entry of his guilty plea,
that in the penalty phase there would be no evidence of the dismissed charges. The court finds
that Levine did advise the defendant that in the penalty phase he would likely be able to keep
out of evidence those photographs that might tend to inflame the jury. Mr. Adkins testified that
to his recollection those particular photographs were not offered into evidence by the State at
the penalty phase.
The court finds, based on the testimony, that Levine was at all times prepared to go to
trial and advised Taylor to go to trial. The court finds Levine did not pressure Taylor to enter
a plea of guilty. The court further finds based on the testimony that the decision to plead guilty
was made voluntarily by Taylor and that it was done so primarily so as not to put Taylor's
family and the victims through a guilty phase trial, and further Taylor did not want to "snitch"
on Deli.
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S COMPENSATION.
Lastly, Taylor claims that Levine's meager compensation for serving as Summit County
Legal Defender caused him to neglect this case and to forego pursuing certain courses of action
that he might otherwise have followed had he been adequately paid and that this also resulted
in a conflict between his own interests and those of Taylor.
The court is of the opinion that evidence of meager compensation alone is insufficient
to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Where and how does one draw the line
under such a theory between compensation that results in effective assistance and compensation
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that results in ineffective assistance'.' Indeed, what about those numerous occasions when defense
counsel have donated their services in capital cases'* Are we to say that in those cases and in
cases where counsel have provided services for less than a customary amount, that defense
counsel was ineffective? Such an approach clearly would be counterproductive for criminal
defendants.
Accordingly, the coun is of the opinion that in order to prevail on this theory defendant
must show that counsel's terms of compensation resulted somehow in a deficient performance
that fell short of an objective standard of a reasonable professional judgment. Indeed it was
based on this theory that defendant argued the relevance of evidence regarding lack of
investigation, failure to file motions, failure to interview witnesses, etc. The court is further of
the opinion that counsel under this theory must show not only a deficient performance but
prejudice to the defendant resulting therefrom.
First, the court is of the opinion that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence a direct conflict resulting from Levine's compensation arrangement. Levine's
unrebutted testimony was, and the coun so finds, that at the time he represented Taylor money
was not a high priority in his life, that he was living by himself and had very low overhead.
Levine testified that he knew he could get more money from the County over and above the
contract base amount. He always knew that for extraordinary services he could obtain additional
compensation. Mr. Adkins testified that when he advised Levine of his low bid on the contract,
Levine responded that the money didn't matter to him, he just enjoyed the work. Levine
testified and the court so finds that money was not an issue with repsect to his decisions
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regarding the course of action he would take in the Taylor trial.
Taylor further argues that the fixed fee system under which Levine was being
compensated created an incentive to pressure clients to plead guilty rather than go to trial. The
facts in this case do not support this argument. First of all there is no testimony presented by
defendant that he was pressured by Levine to plead guilty. Secondly. Robert Adkins. the
Summit County Attorne> testified and the coun so finds, that proportionately, Levine took more
cases to trial as a Summit County Legal Defender than the other legal defenders that the Summit
County Attorney dealt with.
Defense counsel argues that Levine earned something in the neighborhood of $7.00 to
$9.00 an hour for his efforts in the Taylor case. He arrives at that figure by determining the
amount of Levine's compensation under the Summit County contract per month and dividing that
figure by the number of hours per month that Levine stated he worked on Summit County
matters including the Taylor case. According to this argument defense counsel is "damned if
he does and damned if he doesn't". The more time that a defendant's attorney spends on
in a fixed fee arrangement, in order to do a good job for his client, the less he earns per h.
and according to defendant thereby is ineffective because of the meager amount of compensation
earned per hour. On the other hand if the defendant's attorney spends a fewer number ofhours
so as to earn a greater amount per hour then he is condemned for not spending a sufficient
amount of time on the case. This argument, of meager pay per hour, cannot dictate the outcome
of this case. The court must look to what was actually done or not done by defense counsel and
the reasons therefore in determining whether or not the defendant received effective assistance
a case
tour.
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The coun finds that Levine did not obtain Taylor's school records but did spend time
talking to Taylor about his schooling and how well he had done in school.
The court finds that Levine did not request nor obtain personal health records, juvenile
coun records, psychological records regarding other members of Taylor's family, nor records
from social service agencies (although no indication was made as to whether such records
existed) The court finds that Levine did receive Taylor's prison records and Taylor's records
from Adult Probation & Parole. The court finds that Levine did not interview friends of Taylor
nor family members other than Taylor's mother and father. Levine was aware, however,
through his interviews with Taylor, Taylor's parents and his review of the psychological records
of certain family dysfunctions including substance abuse problems by other family members.
Again Levine chose not to introduce those at the penalty phase of the trial. In addition, Levine
testified and the court finds that the decision to have only Taylor and Taylor's father, Tom
Taylor, testify was a family decision. Taylor's mother, for example, felt that she could not
under the circumstances testify.
As to Taylor's friends Taylor testified that he gave Levine the names of certain friends
but made no mention in this remand hearing of who those individuals were or what they would
have stated. There was also testimony to the contrary, that is that Levine was never given
names of friends and the coun so finds.
Defendant called as expert witnesses two lawyers from the Salt Lake County Legal
Defenders' office. Mr. John Hill, the director of the Legal Defenders' office and Ms. Joan
Wan. chief of the Appellate division within the office, both testified. Mr. Hill testified
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regarding the Salt Lake County Legal Defenders' office procedure in capital cases. For
example, two attorneys arc assigned to each capital case. The attorneys have to meet certain
minimum requirements of experience with capital matters. The office retains a full time
mitigation expert. In 1990 and 1991 the office did employ a mitigation expert. Such experts
were available at that time. The standard practice in his office in all capital cases was and is
now a mitigation workup. Mr. Hill testified that the practice in his office was early and
extensive investigation into mitigation matters. He further testified that it was within the sound
discretion of counsel in making a decision whether to use expert mitigation evidence at the
penalty phase. There was further testimony that while the decision to use mitigation evidence
at trial was within the sound discretion of defense counsel the standard governing whether to
investigate mitigation evidence may be more strict.
Mr. Hill also testified that the standard at the present time is different than the standard
in 1991. Mr. Hill testified that whether a standard has been met depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. Ms. Wan testified regarding the law applicable to mitigation and
other matters regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. The thrust of Ms. Watt's testimony
is that the law and standards that she is aware of require full investigation of mitigation matters
and that it was the practice of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office to do so and had been their
practice since prior to 1987. There was however, little if any evidence with regard to
professional norms in 1990 and 1991 outside the Legal Defenders office and Salt Lake County.
Both the attorneys who testified are well respected, competent and knowledgeable
attorneys. Neither of the attorneys called by defendant, however, testified that thev had
STATE V. TAYLOR PAGE FIFTEEN MEMO DECISION
reviewed the record in this particular case with a view to testifying whether Levine's
performance fell short of reasonable professional norms. While such "expert opinion" regarding
a violation of a professional norm may not be required in defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, nevertheless, the court would have considered such testimony to be
significant. No attorneys were called other than those in the Salt Lake County- Legal Defenders'
office.
The court knows of no case that requires, in the penalty phase of a capital case, the
presentation of this "life histon,'" sociological or psychological type of evidence, or that requires
the hiring of a mitigation specialist.
As a matter or record Mr. Levine appeared at the preliminary hearing and cross
examined the State's witnesses. Levine requested and prepared an order for the preparation of
the preliminary hearing transcript. He appeared at the arraignment of Taylor in District Court.
Levine filed a Notice of Intent to Claim Defense of Insanity or Diminished Mental Capacity and
filed a Motion to Appoint Forensic Mental Health Examiners. He filed a Motion to Sever, and
a Motion for Change of Venue. Levine filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial and petitioned
the coun to authorize the hiring of an investigative paralegal. He appeared at the change of plea
and of course throughout the remainder of the proceedings.
Mr. Levine did not file a Motion for a Bill of Particulars or a motion for discovery. The
Summit County Attorney however followed an open file policy and the information available to
the County' Attorney was available to Mr. Levine. Mr. Levine obtained, without formal
discovery, police reports, police nanatives, witness statements, autopsy reports, investigative
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reports, police officer interviews, fire investigation reports, firearm, bullet and laboratory
reports, search warrant affidavit and warrant, an evidence list, and other miscellaneous matters.
He had a brief conference with a ballistics expert regarding this case.
Mr. Levine did not file motions in limine. His testimony is that he preferred to handle
that at trial. Mr. Levine filed no other pretrial motions than those mentioned above. Mr.
Adkins testified that Levine always appeared well prepared at hearings, during plea negotiations
and at trial.
Under all of the circumstances and based upon the facts and reasons stated above, the
court finds that Levine's performance was within the broad range of reasonable professional
judgment.
In spite of the coun's finding that Levine's performance did not fall short of a reasonable
standard, the coun nevertheless feels compelled to address the issue of prejudice.
As a general proposition the court notes that a significant factor that weaves through this
entire procedure is that the evidence of defendant's participation in this crime was
overwhelming. There was an eyewitness to the murders, eyewitnesses to the attempted murder
of Rolph Tiede and the aggravated kidnapping, and further defendant was apprehended by a
police officer as he fled the crime scene in the victims' vehicle, with hostages.
Defendant's burden is to show a "reasonable probability" that a different outcome at the
penalty phase would have occurred had Levine done those things that Taylor claims he should
have done. For example it is claimed that Levine failed to obtain school records, but no
evidence was presented as to what those records would have revealed that Levine did not already
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know, that would have been helpful to the defendant in mitigation. Likewise, defendant claims
that Levine failed to obtain a psychological examination on behalf of the defendant, but there
was no evidence of what such an examination may have shown in mitigation. Defendant claims
Levine failed to interview friends whose names Taylor claims were supplied to Levine. The
coun has previously found that no such names were supplied but in any event, no evidence was
introduced in the remand hearing as to who those friends were or what they may have said in
mitigation. While this list is not intended to be exhaustive, the court notes that in no case of a
claimed failure to follow a certain course of action did defendant present any evidence of how
that course of action may have resulted in a different outcome. Our Supreme Coun has always
recognized this "prejudice" prong as a critical element in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Taylor's attorney argues, as evidence of prejudice, that Taylor's co-defendant, Edward
Deli, received a life sentence whereas Taylor received death. The court disagrees. It should
be remembered that Deli's trial was a guilt or innocence trial not a penalty trial and that Deli
testified that Taylor did all of the shooting at the time the crimes were committed and that he
(Deli) was surprised when Taylor shot the victims and that he had no actual intent to kill. Deli
was convicted of a Second Degree Murder, and was given the maximum sentence available for
that conviction.
The court therefore finds that the defendant has failed to prove prejudice resulting from
any substandard performance on the pan of Levine.
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Counsel for the State is to prepare findings of fact consistent with this Memorandum
Decision, submit them to opposing counsel for approval as to form and then to the court for
signature. !K.
Dated this day of June, 1995
FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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